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Many health  care reform  proposals  expand  insurance  coverage
without fundamentally  changing  the structure  of health insur-
ance.  The stay-well  plan  used  in Mendocino  County,  California,
since 1979, offers an alternative  insurance structure  that pro-
vides  direct incentives  for consumers  to control utilization  and
adopt healthier  lifestyles.
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All countries  - whether  industrial,  developing,  a general,  flexible  form of insurance  that sub-
or in transition  to a market economy  - are  sumes  most conventional  plans as special  cases.
interested  in health  care reform.  A central  focus  The rewards  for low use might  take many forms.
of reform  everywhere  is to make  patients  more  As in the Mendocino  plarn,  die rewards  might be
responsive  to health care costs without  diluting  a credit to a retirement  account,  but they could
the protection  offered  by public  or private  just as easily be annual cash rebates  or credits
insurance.  against  out-of-pocket  expenses  that exceed an
individual's  or family's spending  goal in a future
Conventional  insurance  offers  customers  period.
little incentive  to monitor  their own use of health
care services  or to adopt and maintain  better  Administration  of the stay-well  plan appears
health habits.  not to be unduly  complex.  If anything,  incorpo-
rating  stay-well  incentives  in a single-payer  or
Bogetic  and Heffley  describe  an alternative  national  health care system would  be simpler
health insurance  structure  first adopted  in  than incorporating  them in a self-insured  fund.
Mendocino  County,  California,  in 1979,  and  The success  of the plan hinges on whether
compare  it with conventional  forms  of insurance.  incentives  shift the frequency  distribution  of
The Mendocino  or "stay-well"  plan offers  health  care spending  by reducing  unnecessary
consumers  direct incentives  to control  their use  utilization  in the short-run  and through better
of health care services  and to adopt  healthier  health  care habits,  reducing  long-run costs.
lifestyles.  How well  this insurance  can contain
health care costs depends  on the size of the  Despite  additional  payments  to low usrers,
incentives  and consumer  responsiveness  to them.  the stay-well  plan could  be less expensive  than
conventional  plans with similar coverage.  As in
Conditions  in some developing  countries  and  any insurance  plan, solvency  is enhanced  by
in many countries  moving  to market-based  larger  groups,  better risk-pooling,  economies  of
economies  - overuse  of services,  poor health  scale in administration  and clains processing,
habits, and declining  real incomes  - improves  and grater  bargaining  power with health care
the likelihood  of a favorable  rtsponse to such  providers.
incentives.
How to structure  the stay-well  system
depends  on the country,  but the stay-well  plan is
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I.  BACKGROUND.
'There is a pervasive  feeling of imminent  crisis with respect to the delivery of medical  services
in the United States. Expenditures  on medical  care ae  rising without any offsetting  decline in our
mortality rates -- which compare  poorly  wvith  tho  "  of many other countries. The costs of medical
caro  am increasing  at an accelerating  rate. Many big-city hospitals,  which  service  the poor, are in a
state of  financial distress.  Medicare and Medicaid, the programs developed to enable the
disad-antaged to obtain medical  care, set off the cwrent price spiral by creating  a iapid increase  in
the demand  for medical  services while the supply of those ser-ices could be incmased  only slowly.
The middle class now finds it difficult to obtain the kind of medical  care it has conwe  to expe:t,
namely that of an interested,  warm physician  who is familiar with the family  history. There is a
perceived  over-all  sho.tage of nurses  and  physicians. Moreever,  many  concerned  individuals  believe
that the existing physicians are not distributed  well.  Th;y argue that there are relatively  too few
primary physicians and too many specialists, too few physicians in the inner cities and in rural
areas, and too miany in the affluent suburbs.'  (Lave and LAve,  1970; pp.253-254).
Much attention is being given to possible health care reforms in the UJnited  States2 The
preceding description  of problems,  written  more than two decades  ago, sug-. sts that the problerms
of the health care system  are not new. Nor are the problems  unique to the United  States. Efforts
to rethink and reform health care systems  are widespread in other developed  countries, Eastern
Europe,  and less  developed  countries  in general. 3
1.  Zeljko Bogetic  is a Country Economist,  Europe  and Central Asia Region,  Country  Department  1, The World
Bank. Dennis Heffley is a Professor  of Economics  at The University  of Connecticut. The views  expressed  in this
paper are the authors' and should not be construed  as official views of their respective  institutions. We gratefully
acknowledge  thorough  and constructive  comments  from Alexander  S. Preker,  The World Bank.
2.  Health care reform has emerged as a critical element of the Clinton agenda, but even the previous
administration's  economic  advisors  had come to view reform  as an important  issue. See  Chapter  4 ('Tlhe  Economics
of Health Care') of the January 1993  Economic  Report  of the President for a thorough  overview  of the issues and a
discussion  of various  reform  proposals.
3.  Health has been selected as the primary  focus of the 1993 World  Dwvelopment  Report,  reflecting  the concen
jf The World Bank ard other international  agencies  for improving health care in developing  countries  and ber
understanding  the role of health in rtimulating  economic  development. In a survey of the link between  health  and
development  and the contribution  of health research, Birdsall (1990) identifies 'Analysis of altemnative  financing2
Escalating  expenditures  and lack of universal insurance  are the focal points of American
health care reform, while in Britain,  where  expenditures  are substantially  lower  and services  are
available to all, the length  of queues,  quality of services,  and internal misallocation  of medical
resources  have driven  reform  efforts. Many Eastern  European  nations face the dilemma  of trying
to maintain universal  access to health care services  in the face of sharp de lines in public sector
revenues  associated  with  general economic  reforms. The health  care systems  in these transitional
economies  often suffer from overstaffing,  unnecessanly  large physical facilities  with inadequate
medical equipment,  and overutilization  of services. 4 Health care reform in the LDCs is focused
more cn  the fundamental problerns of inadequate medical resources (providers, facilities,
equipment and supplies), the geographic distribution of these resources, and the failure of
financing  mechanisms  to instill  providers  and patients  with adequate  concern for the cost of care.
Between  and wit-iin  these  blocks of countries  there clcarly  are differences  in the urgency,  nature,
and scope  of health  care reform  efforts. Yet  common  elements  do exist, and lessons  learned  Di  one
context may help to solve  related  problems  in other settings. This,  of course, is why  current U.S.
health  care reform  efforts  are being monitored  closely  by other countries  and international  agencies
such as The World Bank.
In addition to common concerns about how to finance and control rising health ca;e
expenditures, 5 many countries face similar problems in encouraging healthier lifestyles that
would  reduce  the need  for medical  intervention.  While  some  developed  countries  report  significant
reductions in per capita consumption of tobacco and distilled spirits, 6 personal health habits
remain poor in many areas,  including  Central  and Eastern  Euwope. For example,  a recent review
of Bulgaria's  publir sector  notes that: "Indicators  of the health of the population  in Bulgaria  show
an overall pattern that  compares  unfavorably  with W- 2em  Europe  but is typical  of the  countries  in
anXtral  and Eastern  Europe." The  report further  notes  that "...the  main source  of differences  in life
expectancy  between  Bulgaria  and  other  countries  is in diseases  of the circulatory  system,  with
nechanisms  for health care, and alternative  mechanisms  for controlling  costs' as a key area of potentially  fruitful
research.
4.  For a detailed  discussion  of the problems  and prospects  for health care reform in these  countries,  see Preker
and Feachem  (1993).
5.  Korea,  for example, '  experienced  very  rapid  increases  in  health expenditures.  In the 1980-1985  period,  real
health expenditure. grew at an annual rate of almost 17 percent,  of which 15.4 percent was attributable  to rising
utilization  and intensit , only 1.4  percent  of the increase  was due to demographic  factors. Overutilization  appears  to
be a significant  problem  in Korea,  despite  considerable  'out-of-pocket' fmincing (51 percent  in 198S). For further
details  of the Korean  experience,  see De  Geyndt  (1991).
6.  See, for example,  Tables No.201  (p.123)  and No.209  (p.127) of the Statistical Abstract  of the United  Star
(1991).3
particularly  hi"h levels  of stroke."  (The World Bank, 1993a;  eh. 6).  In Hungary,  where mortality
rates are among the highest in the world, "...expenditures  have not secured  large gains in health
standards, primarily because of unhealthy lifestyles and a bias toward curative hospital care."
(Preker, 1993; p.4).  Similarly, in  a recent World Bank study of Romania, it was noted that
morbidity patterns reflect "...(a) poor individual preventive health measures; (b) unhealthy
behavior  patterns (i.e., smoking)..."  and that "circulatory  diseases  are the most impottant  cause of
death and disability, and account for 10 percent of hospitalizations.(The World Bank, 1992,
p.107).  Similar patterns exist in other  Eastern European countries, but the incidence of
behaviorally-induced  diseases  is also high in some Latin  American countries. These problems
have  contributed  to rising  utilization  rates  and the escalation  of health  care  costs, causing  a number
of countries  (e.g.,  Chile,  Costa Rica,  and Brazil)  to embark  on major hea)th  reforms. 7
The purpose of this paper is not to discuss U.S. health  care reform,  about which much has
been written, but rather to describe  an innovative,  more  flexible,  and more  general form of health
insurance  that has been owerlooked  in current discussions  of reform. Some ideas  about how this
type of insurance  might be adapted  to a broad range  of health  care systems,  regardless  of whether
insurance is privately or publicly funded, also will be given.  The remainder of the paper is
organized as follows.  Section II describes a fundamental  problem in most health insurance
arrangements  and poses a question that is central to the success  or failure  of proposed  reforms.
Properties  of conventional  health  insurance  are described  in Section  m, while  Section  IV outlines
the essential features  of an innovative  plan that has operated  successfully  in one California  county
school system for more than a decadc. Adaptation  of this plan to national  health care systems  is
discussed  in Section  V, and some  final remarks  are offered  in Section  VI.
II.  A  RECURRENT  QUESTION:  HOW  CAN  PATIENTS  BE  MADE  MORE
RESPONSIVE  TO THE  COST  OF HEALTH  CARE WITHOUT REDUCING
INSURANCE  PROTECTION?
To ensure greater  access to services  and reduce  the risk of financial  loss from illness,  many
health care systems have severed the link between the utilization and financing  of health clre
services. This severance  occurs in systems of socially  provided  care, as in Britain,  as well as in
systems where government  serves only as the principal  insurer, such as Canada. In both cases,
health care services ultimately  are financed  through  general tax revenues rather than direct user
charges. Under both arrangt  .nents,  effective prices at the time of utilization  are negligible. The
consumer is insulated from risk but also becomes  less  aware of the true social  cost of providing
health  care. The fiully  insure, consume;  may  have  less  incentive  to undertake  personal
7.  See World Development Report (1993b), chapters 3 and 7.4
activities that reduce the need for medIical  care.  Both responses -- more utilization  of covered
services and less risk avoidance -- have been desc-4hed  as 'moral hazard," the tendency for
consumers to behave differently when insured. 8 Because of  these moral hazard effects,
insurance increases the demand for medical services. 9 If the supply of services cannot satisfy
the demand  forthcoming  at a near-zero  price,  some form of non-price  rationing  must be adopted  or
inevitably  will emerge.
Even in the U.S. health care system,  where the private sector has played  a more important
role in insuring  consumers  and providing  health care, the introduction  of major public insurance
programs (Medicare and Medicaid) and the spread of private insurance,  especially through  the
workplace, 10 have expanded the demand for care, raised concerns about moral hazard and
socially inefficient levels of utilization,  and stimulated the search for offective  ways to control
utilization and costs. These cost containment approaches include greatsr 'cost-sharing" (highez
coinsurance  rates), various  forms of utilization  review under  the rubric  of "managed  care,' ana the
introduction  of ""lternative  delivery systems' (e.g., health maintenance rganizations or HMOs)
that  are thought  to have stronger  incentives  or more effective  ways to contxol  utilization.  However,
any such effort to raise coinsurance rates or to limit access to services often is perceived by
consumers  as a benefit  reduction  and loss  of insurance  protection.' 1 Indeed,  the natural
8.  Pauly (1968) generally is credited with explaining the economic incentives  underlying the moral hazard
problem. While moral hazard has been extensively  discussed  within the context of private  health insurance  plas,
the same  problem  plagues  public health insuance systems. For example, moral  hazard appears  to be a particularly
acute problem in Easter. Europe. For an overview  of the problem in the Bulgarian  health care system, which is
quite similar  to those of other  Eastem European  co..utries,  see The World Bank (1993a),  Ch. 6.
9.  If the agency  relationship  between  consumers  and providers  of health  care extends  beyond  medical  decisions  to
include  financial  interests,  providers  also may exhibit  a form of moral hazard  by recommending  services to insured
patients  that would  not be recommended  to uainsured  patients. We focus  on the problem  of structuring  insurance  to
give consumers appropriate incentives, but the problem of structuring provider reimbursement-  to induce cost-
effective  forms  of health care also merits  attention.
10.  In 1960,  consumers  directly  paid 55.9 percent  of U.S. personal  health care expenditures.  By 1990,  this figure
had declined to 23.3 percent [see Levit et aL  (1991), p.50]. This average coinsurance  rate for the entire population
may understate the degree of insurance coverage among insured individuals, since approximately  35 million
Americans  have no insurance  [Eonomic Report  of the President  (1993),  p. 1 34].
11.  Beyond  the problem  of consumer  resistance  to cost-sharing,  there  is considerable  debate  about the effectivwess
of higher coinsurance  rates or copayments  on utilization  and expenditures. The Rand Health lsurance  Study is
viewed  as one of the most  comprehensive  attempts  to evaluate  the effects  sf cost-sharing  on utiliz..ion, expenditures
and L.alth status.  Rand researchers  conclude that "...the response to cost-sharing  is nontrivial.' [Manning et aL
(1987)1. Implied price elasticities of demand in the Rand study are roughly -.2, but such estimates vary across5
resistance  by consurners  to such changes  has been an obstacle  to meaningful  health care reform  in
the U.S. and elsewhere. The success of reform efforts in many settings .nay well hinge on one
central quesdon: Can wefind more  positive ways  to encourage  the rational use of health  care -
ways that reward healthy lifestyles and pndent  consumption  of health care services -- without
substantially  reducing  thefinancial -rotection  offered  by he -'th insurance? Finding  aii answer to
this question may require fundamental change3 in the stin'iture of public and private health
insurance.
III.  PROPERTIFS  OF  CONVENTIONAL  HEALTH  INSURANCE.
Consumers derive proit-ztion  from health insurance  by knowing that when expenses are
incurred they will not have to pay the full amount out-of-pocket. Indeed, under full insurance
(zero coinsurance,  c = 0), common in mary public insurance programs,  out-of-pocket expense
(E 1 ) is zero regardless of the full expense (E).  In some public programs and most private
insurance  plans, some  fraction  of the total expense  (c < 1) must be paid by the patient. The larger
the coinsurance  rate, the less the insurance  protection. For each of these conventional types of
insurance,  full coverage  and partial coverage,  the relationship  between out-of-pocket  expense  and
total expense  is shown  in Figure 1.
[FIGURE  1]
In the absence of insurance xc =  1), out-of-pocket expense equals the full expense, as
depicted  by the 45 degree  line in Figure 1. Under  partial insurance  plans, E. rises with increases
in E, but the lower the coinsurance  rate (c), the less  the increase  in E will be felt by the consumer.
Under  full coverage,  Eo is always zero  and the consumer  is entirely insulated  from the full cost c'
care. Thus, conventional  insurance,  particularly  full coverage,  reduces  the financial  risk associated
with illness,  but also diminishes the consumer's  sensitivity  to the true cost of care; this, in turn,
may lead to excessive utilization and reduced personal efforts to remain healthy (i.e., moral
hazard). One way to discourage unnecessary  utilization in convendonal insurance plans is to
impose  a deductible,  where  coverage  only begins  after the consumer  has expended  a specified
different  types  of services  and may  be sensitive  to the unusual  insurance  structure  used in the experiment. In general,
one would  expect  cost-sharing  to be most effective  in containing  utilization  of elective or non-emergency  medical
services,  but the effectiveness  of cost-sharing  is asso  likely  to vary  with existing  levels  of price,  coinsurance,  income
and other  factors  that influence  the demand for  medical  services.  For a thorough  review  of the demand-side  literatue,
see Chapter  3 of Rosko  and Broyles  (1988).6
initdil amount (Ed) on health  care.12 In Figure 1, this case is depicted  by the kinked  relationship
between Eo  and E  Note that any increase  in the coinsurance  rate or the deductible  level will be
viewed  by the consumer  as a reduction  in insurance  benefits.
A general problem withl  most conventional forms of insurance  is that low utilization by
consumers  goes unrewarded. In partial or full covtrage plans, low utilizers may  be reassured  by
the fact that, if the need  arises, a portion  or even the full cost of care will be paid by the insurer.
But invariably  there may  be a strong  feeling that benefits  of the insurance  are "lost' if no medical
services  are consumed. Thwre  typically is no way to convert this foregone insurance  benefit to
some  oither  form of reward. Apart from the psychic security  of knowing  he or she is insured,  there
is no way for the insured  person to benefit from conventional  forms of coverage  unless services
are utilized. This lack  of reward  for low utilization  encourages  unnecessary  use of the systein.
A second,  related  problem  in conventional  insurance  plans  is the lack  of direct  incentives  for
consu-ners to adopt healthier lifestyles. Although some private pl'ans  offer lower premiums to
non-smokers,  non-obese,  or other groups who exhibit lower health risks, once an individual is
enrolled  in such plaus  there is little, if any, reward for maintaining  or further  improving  personal
healtt. habits. The significance  of this second flaw in the structure of conventional  i  urance
grows  as we acquire  additional  empirical  evidence  that lifestyle  strongly  influences  the incidence  of
major diseases  and the  cost of health  care.  13
IV.  AN INNOVATIVE FORM  OF  HEALTH  INSURANCE:  THE  MENDOCINO
OR  STAY-WELL PLAN.
Health insurance  markets  in the U.S. have changed significantly  in the past decade or two.
Of particular note are insurers'  efforts to monitor and control costs in more direct ways. Ilese
efforts,  among  others,  include:  the introduction  of requirements  for second  opinions  by physicians
or pre-approval  by the insurer  for certain  types  of treatment;  consolidation  of health  insurance  and
health  care provision  in the form of prepaid  HMOs;  and direct  bargaining  by the insurer  for service
fee discounts from a specific group of providers (preferred provider organizations  or PPOs).
Since  the 1980s  also has been a period of unprecedented  increase  in U.S.  health  care  expenditures,
12.  One problem with imposing  a deductible is that it is properly viewed by the consumer  as a reduction in
insurance  protection;  the insured  is now fully  exposed  for the first Ed dollars  of expenswe.  Hospital  expenses  are often
subject to an initial deductible  with additional  expenses fully covered. In Figure 1, this insurance  structure  would
appear  as a kinked  relationship  following  the 45 degree  line to Ed and then  becoming  honizontal  for E > Ed.
13.  For a detailed  analysis  of the social  cozts  of poor health  habits,  see Manning  ei  al. (1991).7
there is little  primafacie  evidence  that these  structural  chan-cs have helped  to contain  outlays  on
health  care.14
This lack of apparernt  success  in cortrolling U.S. health  care costs may  reflect the fact  that,
even in prepaid plans, the fundamnental  problemns  of health ins.rance, cited earlier, have  not been
addressed.  For example, once enrolled, the HMO or PPO member faces zero o. very small
copayments  and has little incentive  to control  utilizatio:n;  thus low utilization  remains unrewarded.
S;milarly,  the near complete  coverage  in preEaid  plans  provides  little incentive or personal  changes
in lifestyle that might reduce the need ior servicoes.  Unfortunately,  popular  reform proposals  do
little more to alter the basic structure of heath insurance. Health  insurance  may  be extended  to a
larger percentage  of the populaffon  to reduce  the problem  of 'uninsureds,"  but the structure  of the
insurance is apt to look mnuch  like one of the couventional forms of insurarce depicted abcvc in
Figure 1. Alternatives,  however,  do exist.
The plan  of interest is one that  originated  ir California  in 1979. In the late 1970s,  California
local and county governments were seeking  ways to bring their costs into line with state-wide
limitations on property-tax revenues.  As a result, education officials in Mendocino County
devised  an innovative  health insurance  plan for their employees. The plan, which  remains  solvent
and in effect today, provided incentives  to limit unnecessary  utilization and to adopt healthier
lifestyles,  without  sacrificing  relatively  complete  coverage.
Before the stay-well plan was introduced, Mendocino County school employeer had
enjoyed 'first-dollar coverage" which, in 1979, cost about $1260 per employee per year. The
County terminated  this plan and signed  a new contract  with Blue  Shield  of California,  a non-profit
insurer. Tlhe  new contract called for a lower-premium  ($780  per employee  per year)  policy  with  a
$500 deductible. The savings ($480 per employee) were set aside by the County in an interest-
bearing, self-insurance fund that would  be used to pay the first $500 of any employee's  annual
medical bills.  Total annual chorges  in excess of $500 were to be paid by the new Blue S"..eld
policy.  Thus, from the employee's  perspective,  he or she still enjoyed complete  coverage. 'Tiis
was an important  aspect in eliciting  employee  acceptance  of the new plan.
The most interesting and innovative component of the Mendocino Plan was a further
stipulation  that any portion of the $500 in the self-insurance  fund not used  by an employee  during
the year would  accrue in his or her name  and  be paid to the employee  upun  quitting  or retiring  from
14.  Barth  and Heffley  (1992)  give  an  overview  and  analys.s  of health  care  policy,  receot  expenditure  paterns,  and
reform  proposals. A more  technical  analysis  of the  potentially  adverse  effects  of HMOs  on health  care  prices  is
given  by Beaaglou  and  Heffley  (forthcoming).8
County service. For example, an employee with only $200 in claims during the year would  not
only have those claims paid by the self-insurance  fund, but would receive  a future bonus  of $300
(plus any other accumulated  amounts)  at the time of separation. This inceitive component  of the
plan,  similar to the "no  claims bonus"  found in some  auto insurance  policies,  directly  rewarded  the
employee  for not overutilizing  health care, but it also provided some incentive  to adopt healthier
lifestyles that might reduce the need for medical care.  In addition to significantly reducing
claims, 15 the rAay-well  plan reportedly prompted a number of employees to increase their
exercise,  lose weight,  quit smoking,  reduce  alcohol intake, etc. These, of course,  are precisly the
types  of responses  we would  like a health insurance  plan to evoke, yet conventional  full-coverage
plans  are likely  to reduce the insured  party's incentive  to adopt hea!th-preseving  habits.
Thc employer (M.-ndocino  County)  appears to have been very satisfied  with this plan. The
new, lower premiums were stabilized  due tw  the favorable  claims performance  of the group and,
although  sorie of the premium savings  placed in the self-insurance  fund were paid out to r,meet  the
first $500 of each employee's  claims, not all of the funds were used, and the interest generated  by
the fund was retained  by the employer.
Employees,  too, benefitted. Despite  some initial resistance  of employee  groups  who  feared
a reduction  in benefits,  it soon became  obvious that workers were truy better  uff. Effective  first-
dollar coverage  was preservec for high-utiliL_rs,  since  the first $500 in claims  were covered  by the
self-insurance  fund and excess  claims were covered  by Blue Shield. Moreover,  low-utilizers  now
had something  that they had not enjoyed under the previous  conventional  plan. If a worker's  total
Oaims on the self-insurance  fune were less than $500, the 'unused" portion  of this self-insurance
was converted to a future cash benefit for the employee. This reward for lcw utilization  did not
exist under  the previous  conventional  insurance  plan.
The Mendocino or stay-well plan received a good deal of national at.ention in the early
1980s,16  and a few other employers adopted similar plans.  Yet, despite Mendocino County's
apparent  success  and sat.faction with the plan, it has not been implemented  on a much  larger  scale
in the U.S. 17 This may well be due to resistance from insurers to any plan that significantly
reduces  premium  cash flow. For many insurers,  investment  income from the premium  flow,  as
15.  Conway  (1980) reports  that only 38 of the 2i$ persons  initially enrolled  in the plan  exceeded  the $500  figure
and therefore  received no bonus.  Each of the remaining 180 persons'  had claims of less than $500 and received a
bonus, including  66 who received  the naximum  bonus of $500 for baving no claims.
16.  See, for example,  Conway  (1980),  Newsweek  (1980), and lTm (1980).
17.  Zweifel (1988) describes a premium rebate scheme offered by some private health insurers in Germany.
Empirical  results te-nd  to confurm  that the plan contains  costs more  effectively  than simple increases  in coinsurance
rates.9
opposed to net income from selling and servicing  policies,  is a major source  of final profit. Any
private insurance  reform  that reduces  the premium  flow is likely  to be opposed  by insurers.
There have been concerns about the Mendocino  plan. Critics, for example,  worried about
the possibility  of truly sick employees  foregoing  needed  care, resulting  in poorer  health  and larger
outlays  in the future. Mendocino  County  and Blue Shield  tried to minimize  the possibility  of such
a response  by issuing  a brochure  that encouraged  members  of the plan to be sensible  about seeking
,re  and alerted  them to various symptoms  that should  not be ignored. It is also likely,  that  at least
some of the reported reduction in claims was due to shifting of claims to other policies by
employees  with dual coverage under a spouse's  health care plan.  Yet, in a market setting,  even
this response  could be beneficial: the adoption  of a stay-well incentive by some insurers might
force other insurers to adopt similar provisions  to avoid the adverse effects of claims shiftirg.
More recently,  concerns  also have  emerged  about  the declining  real incentives;  the $500 maximum
bonus for zero utilization  has not been increased  since  the plan began. Measured  in 1980  dollars,
the maximum  bonus has decreased  from  $500 to $293  due to the effects  of general  inflation. Even
more  rapid  inflation  in medical  care prices  also has made  it increasingly  difficult  for members  of the
plan to qualify  for a bonus. These problems,  which  are readily  overcome by appropriate  indexing
of the plan, have weakened but apparently  not eliminated the initial incentives  embodied in the
stay-well  plan.
The stay-well  approach  adopted  in Mendocino  County seems to have  a number  of attactive
features  including:  the preservation  of rather  complete  coverage;  direct incentives  for individuals  to
monitor  their  utilization  without  heavy-handed  forms  of managed  care, since  the implicit  price  of an
unnecessary  visit  or procedure  is a smaller  future  reward;  incentives  to adopt healthier  lifestyles;  an
opportunity  for low-utilizers  and those with healthy  lifestyles to convert unused  portions  of their
health insurance  into cash benefits;  and potentially  a lower overall outlay on health care for the
insured  group.
V.  EXTENDING  THE  STAY-WELL CONCEPT  TO  A  NATIONAL  HEALTH
CARE  SYSTEM.
In order to see how the the stay-well  incentive  might be applied to a national  health care
system,  as opposed to a particular group of workers,  it is important to understand  how this plan
differs in structure  from the conventional  forms of insurance  depicted in Figure 1. The stay-well
plan  contains  three important  parameters:  (1) a goal  expenditure  level (per individual  or household)
which may  be denoted  Eg; (2) a rate  of reward,  denoted  r, for individuals  or households  with10
health care expenditures less than Eg; and (3) a rate of coinsurance, denoted c,  for total
expenditures  in excess of E.  Figure 2 illustrates  the relationship  between  out-of-pocket  expense
and the full cost  of health  care for a hypothetical  stay-well  plan.
[FIGURE  21
Note that when expenditures  are less than the goal (E < Eg), out-of-pocket expense is
negative, reflecting  the potential  reward to low utilizers. Here, where  r = 1, the insuired  receives
the entire difference between Eg and E.  There is no reason why this value (r = 1) would be
optimal, but the smaller the reward  parameter, the weaker  the incentive  to remain healthy  and to
avoid unnecessary  utilization.  When full cost exceeds  the goal  (E > Eg), the coinsurance  parameter
(c) determines  the portion of the excess cost that must be borne by the insured. In Figure 2, c is
depicted as a fraction; full coverage  would require a zero  coinsurance  rate.  As in any insurance
plan, the problem faced by the insurer is how to structure  the plan or, here, how to select Eg, r,
and c to achieve certain objectives. For commercial  insurers,  profitability,  or at least actuarial
soundness, may be the overriding objective; for public insurers the objective(s)  may be more
complex, reflecting  concerns for the overal!  cost of the plan, its effects on particular groups  of
consumers  and providers,  and its impacts  on measures  of health  status. Given the complexity  of
the problem, it is likely that the optimal structure  will vary for different systems. However,  if
utilization  and health  habits  are at all sensitive  to financial  incentives,  there is a case  for this type  of
insurance  in a varety of institutional  settings.' 8
Although we cannot say much about precisely how to structure such a plan in a given
country without  a good deal more country-specific  information,  several  aspects of this plan are
noteworthy. First, the stay-well plan is a more general and more  flexible form of insurance,
subsuming  most ccnventional  plans  as special  cases. For example,  if Eg is set to zero and c c 1,
we have conventional partial coverage. Similarly, if Eg = Ed, r =  1, c <  1, and the insured is
required to pay a lump-sum "tax' equal to rEg, regardless  of the full expense for that individual,
the stay-well  structure  in Figure 2 is shifted up so that it becomes  equivalent  to the conventional
deductible  plan shown  in Figure 1.
Second,  the rewards  for low utilization  might take  a variety  of forms. As in the Mendocino
plan, th . rewards might constitute  a credit  to a retirement  account,  but they  could  just as easily be
annual  cash rebates,  or credits  against  out-of-pocket  expenses  that might  be incurred  if the
18.  Thbe  plan may  be particularly  relevant  to the Eastern  European  setting,  where  utilization  is high, behaviorally
induced diseases are common, and declining real incomes might  cause individuals  to respond favorably to new
financial  incentives  to reduce  utilization  and modify  uihealthy behavios11
individual  or family  exceeds  the expenditure  goal (Eg) in a future  period.
Third, administration of the stay-well plan does not appear to be unduly complex.  In
Mendocino,  where initial expenditures  (E < Eg) are paid by the employer  from a self-insurance
fund and subsequent  outlays (E > Eg) are covered by the insurer,  processing  and coordination  of
claims is done through a local medical foundation. If anything, incorporation  of a stay-well
incentive  in a single-payer  or national  health care system would  be somewhat  simpler. Insurance
records of participants would need to contain information  about the depletion (if any) of their
potential reward, based on expenditures to date.  At  the end of the accounting period, these
records would  be used  to issue reward checks  or to credit the individual  in some  other fashion.
Fourth, success  of the stay-well plan in reducing  overall costs to the system hinges  on the
capacity of the incentive  to shift the frequency  distribution  of health  care  spending. The purpose  of
the stay-well  incentive  is to reduce unnecessary  utilization  in the short-run  and, in the long-run,  to
further reduce the need for care by stimulating  better health habits. If utilization  and personal
habits are sufficiently  responsive  to such incentives,  the plan may  reduce  overall  system  costs.  19
Fifth, financial  solvency  of the plan requires  that revenues from  various sources  (premiums
paid by  individuals and/or employers, government subsidies, and income from any initial
endowments) be sufficient to cover not only the insured portion of charges for high utilizers
(E > Eg), but also the insured charges and rewards for low utilizers (E < Eg), as well as any
administrative costs and allowed profits.  Again, the plan has a better chance of remaining
independently  solvent  (i.e., not dependent  on external  subsidies)  if parficipants'  demand  for health
care and their willingness to adopt better health habits are sufficiently responsive  to financial
incentives. It should  be emphasized  that, despite  the additional  payments  to low utilizers,  the stay-
19.  One might argue that hospital expenditures,  which typically account for a significant proportion of total
health care expenditures,  will be less affected by the stay-well  incentive. First, the demand  for hospital  care will be
less responsive to financial incentives than other, less expensive types of services (e.g., routine office visits or
examrs). Second, the power  of the stay-well incentive  hinges on the size of the reward;  the lower the reward, the
lower the power to affect excessive  utilization and , particularly,  to reduce the use of costly hospital services. We
would argue, however, that this is essentially an empirical  question that crucially  depends on the expenditure
distribution, demographic factors, and lifestyle characteristics  of the population.  Relationships  between these
features  of the population  and their responses  (both utilization  and health habits)  to financial  incentives  would  need
to be studied  befoe a large-scale  stay-well plan is introduced  (see the Section VI for some  thoughts  on this matter).
If, however, poor lifestyle  is .n important  contributor  to illnesses  or diseases  that  ultimately  require  hospitalization,
or if a portion of  inappropriate' hospitalization is initiated by routine physician visits, even relatively modest
incentives  provided  by the stay-well  plan might  be effective  in reducing  hospital  costs,  particularly  in the long run.12
well plan is potentially  less  expensive  than conventional  plans with comparable  coverage. If the
incentive  causes consumers  to reduce utilization,  search for less expensive  providers,  and adopt
better health  habits, and if these responses  also reduce the frequency  of claims  and administrative
costs, the stay-well  plan may lower overall costs.  Also, as in ary insurance  plan, solvency is
enhanced  by group size,  due to better  risk-pooling  (less exposure to "large loss"  effects),  potential
economies  of scale in administrative  costs  and claims processing,  and greater  birgaining  power  for
the insurer  in exacting  favorable  terms  from providers  of medical  care.
Finally, the stay-well  plan has certain  intergenerational  implications.  For example,  younger
participants,  with better immunological  and health  characteristics,  could be the main beneficiaries
of the plan's financial  incentives  if a single expenditure  goal (Eg) is established. This problem
could be addressed  by scaling  the expenditure  goal to age or other  relevant characteristics,  thereby
giving a broader range of opportunities  for individuals to benefit from reduced utilization  and
improved  health  habits. Such modifications  could increase  administrative  costs,  but increasing  the
number  of parameters  of the insurance  plan also might reduce medical  expenditures  by allowing
administrators  to better "fit" the plan to characteristics  and responses of the population. It also
should  be pointed  out that,  even if they  cannot  cannot directly  benefit from the financial  incentive,
'inherently high utilizers' may  enjoy lower  out-of-pocket  costs  if savings  induced  by the stay-weU
incentive  can be used  to provide  more  complete  insurance  coverage  (lower  coinsurance  rates).
VI.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS.
The fundamental  dilemma facing health care reformers in many different settings is the
conflict  between  expanding  or maintaining  access to health care and controlling  health  care costs.
Under conventional insurance, attempts to  remove financial barriers to care by lowering
coinsurance  rates  or extending  existing  coverage  to the uninsurel tend  to increase  demand  for care,
forcing up utilization  and prices in a market setting or increasing  the need for rationing in a non-
market system. This increased  demand  stems  frorn the lower (perhaps  zero)  out-of-pocket  cost to
consumers,  as well as the reduced incentive  for consumers to avoid health  problems. It follows
that one way to increase access without necessarily increasing health care costs is to alter the
structure of insurance to provide stronger incentives for well-protected consumers to adopt
healthier  lifestyles  and to avoid unnecessary  utilization.
The stay-well plan is a simple, yet more general, form of insurance that rewards lower
util,zation of health care services and encourages positive health habits.  Mendocino County's
thirteen  years  of experience  with this  type  of plan suggest  that it may  be a useful  way  of balancing13
the objectives of cost containment and comprehensive  insurance protection. Why this type of
insurance  has not spread or come to the forefront in current discussions  of health care reform is
unclear. Private insurers may simply lack the incentive  to develop or accept innovations  in the
structure  of insurance  that would lead to lower premiums. 20 To our knowledge  the plan has not
been implemented  in a public health  care system,  but the structure  of the plan is general  enough to
allow it to be adapted  to a wide  variety  of health  care systems.
Further study of the stay-well  plan is clearly needed. Much of the information  about the
response  of consumers  to this incentive-based  plan is anecdotal  in nature. Existing plans  ought to
be studied more closely, but such plans appear  to be scarce  and the study of any existing plan is
subject to questions about the representativeness  of the sample.  An alternative approach to
acquiring  more informnation  about the feasibility  and  effectiveness  of stay-well  insurance  might  be
the establishment of demonstration projects, in which individuals or families are randomly
assigned to either stay-well or conventional insurance plans.  Establishing sufficiently large
samples  and using multivariate  techniques  to control for personal or demographic  characteristics
that might also influence behavior, the effects of the difference in insurance  structure  could be
estimated. Given the policy importance  that has been attached to health  care reforn, the cost of
operating  such  projects  mnight  be small  relative  to the potential  payoff.
There are no easy solutions  to the fundamental  question posed in Section II, regarding  the
difficulty of insilling consumers with appropriate  incentives  without significantly  reducing the
protection affordad by health insurance. Insured  consumers  have economic  incentives  to be less
careful about their health habits and to consume even those services that do relatively little to
maintain  or improve health. The more comprehensive  the coverage, the stronger these adverse
incentives  will be. The stay-well  plan provides  a countervailing  incentive  for even fully insured
persons  to monitor their own health habits and to avoid unnecessary  udlization. We believe  that
some  additional incentive  of this type is needed to obtain the desired balance  between the social
objectives  of insurance  protection  and health  care cost containmenL  There may  be other forms of
insurance  that  would  achieve this balance  as well  or even more  effectively  than the stay-well  plan.
What seems  clear is that conventional  insurance  has failed in this regard  and, if we are to resolve
the whealth  care crisis," we need to think much more creatively ab(ut the strture  of insurance
and the signals  it conveys  to consumers  and health  care providers.
20.  The stay-weU  plan was accepted  by the insurer,  Blue  Shield  of California,  but was  designod  by Ed Nickaeman,
an Assistant  Superintendent  of Schools  in Mendocino  County.14
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